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ONTOLOGIC VERSUS EPISTEMOLOGIC:
SOME STRANDS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOGIC,
1837-1957*
Traditionally the subject matter of logic comprised judgements and
inferences, that is, the products of certain (mental) acts. Indeed, Thomas
Aquinas even characterized logic as the study of terms in 'the second
intention', that is, such terms that themselves have mental entities as
their intention, examples being the term 'term', the term 'judgement' and
the term 'inference'. Today, on the other hand, authoritative elementary
text books in Logic make no mention of products of mental acts: the
acting logical subject that has to draw the inferences in question has, as
it were, been squeezed out of the province of logic.
Inferences, that is, acts of passage in which a certain judgement,
the conclusion of the inference, is drawn on the basis of certain already
made judgements, the premisses of the inference, have yielded their
central place at the hard core of logic to relations of logical consequence
between propositions that serve as contents of the judgements involved,
or even more commonly, between well-formed formulae, that is, between
meta-mathematical objects of an uninterpreted formal language. In the
present paper I intend to review some of the steps in the process
whereby this came about, as well as mention a couple of philosophical
corollaries.
Quine, in 1952, held that 'logic is an old subject and since 1879 it
has been a great one1.1 No one reasonably informed concerning the
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development of logic could possibly object to the first part of this
statement, but I want to take mild exception to the second: logic was
great also prior to to the appearance of Frege's Begriffsschrift.2 From the
perspective I am concerned to develop here, 1837 is as important a year
as 1879. In that year Bernhard Bolzano's Wissenschaftslehre made its
appearance in four mighty tomes.3 The traditional logic that Bolzano
rejected can be set out compactly in the following way:4
Mental operation
Simple Apprehension
Judging,
Composition/Division
Reasoning,
Inferring
(Mental) Product
Concept,
Idea,
(Mental) Term
Judgement,
(Mental) Proposition
(Mental) Inference
External Sign
(Written/spoken)
Term
Assertion,
(Written/spoken)
Proposition
(Written/spoken)
Inference,
Reasoning
In particular, traditional logic held that the act of judgement
consisted of an act of joining or separating two terms already obtained,
the subject and the predicate of the judgement in question, and
accordingly the judgement made had the subject/copula/predicate form
S is P.
Bolzano replaced this traditional form with the form
truth adheres to the propositional content A,
and the situation as regards acts of judgements and their products can be
set out as follows:
2
 Louis Nebert, Halle, Jena 1879.
3
 J. von Seidel, Sulzbach.
4
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Ward, London 1946, pp. 6-7.
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judgement-
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content
prop A is true
judgement made.
Bolzano was a logical platonist; the propositions that serve as
contents of the judgements made were totally an sich, both with respect
to their being and their truth or falsity. A Satz an sich is independent of
any act of linguistic Setzung or of thought, and the truth of a true proposi-
tion is completely independent of any acts of truthmaking. Thus, the act of
judgement is valid, and the judgement made is correct, or evident, to
speak with Brentano, when the Satz an sich that serves as prepositional
content of the judgement in question is a truth an sich, rather than vice
versa.
Similarly, the validity of an act of inference is reduced to that of a
relation of logical consequence between the propositions serving as con-
tents of the premisses and conclusion of the judgement in question.
Bolzano nevertheless clearly acknowledged the epistemological role of
logic: Urteile and Schlüsse are central notions within the subject, even
though their key properties are ultimately reduced to an sich notions.
The work of Frege constitutes no advance over that of Bolzano, as
far as the form of judgement
(proposition) A is true
is concerned.5 It was used also by Frege, probably in complete in-
dependence from the earlier work. His 1879 achievement comprises three
crucial parts that are of relevance from the present perspective, namely:
(i) the invention of the interpreted formal language, the Begriffsschrift,
(ii) the insight that the mathematical function/argument structure to
analyze the form, not of judgements, but of their propositional contents,
and (iii) the use of the special "assertion sign" (not Frege's term, but it
' Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, Vol I, §2, Jena 1893.
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states just what I want to stress) that brings out the epistemological
links of logic.
In all three respects there is a substantial advance as compared to
Bolzano. The three points are, of course, interrelated. In particular, the
latter two constitute features of the B e griff s sehr if t in question. Frege
quite explicitly emphasizes the epistemological side of logic at the cost of
the ontological: the notion of 'fact' is expurgated as being nothing but a
true proposition in Der Gedanke and the notion of Sachverhalt does not
even occur in his work: if we want to solve the proportion
state of affairs X
fact true proposition
the only solution for X seems to be proposition.^ Furthermore, we should
note that Frege leaves truth essentially unanalyzed: according to him it is
completely sui generis, or in his terms, 'undefinable'.
The epistemological vision of logic, using an interpreted formal lan-
guage, as well as an assertion sign, was retained by Russell.7 The next
step towards a subject-less ontologized conception of logic is perhaps
best seen as a response to a certain tension among the basic principles of
logic, which was independently felt simultaneously in 1907-8 at
Cambridge and in Amsterdam. The tension in question is that between,
on the one hand, the law of bivalence, a principle clearly adhered to both
by Bolzano and Frege, which states that each proposition is either true or
false, independently of whether or not it can be known as such, and, on
the other hand, the principle of the knowability of truth. G.E. Moore, in his
Aristotelian Society address on 'Professor James' Pragmatism' remarked
on the tension and, with the zeal of a renegade idealist, opted for to
acknowledge the possibility of unknowable truths.8 Indeed, one can only
point to potential examples here: an actual, known example of an
unknowable truth would represent a contradiction in terms. Indeed, an
assertion to the effect that
"P is true, but in principle unknowable."
6
 'Der Gedanke', Beiträge zur Philosophie der deutschen Idealismus, l (1918-19), pp. 58-77.
7
 A. N. Whitehead and B. Russell, Principia Mathematica, Vol. l, Cambridge U.P., 1910.
8
 Proc. Arist. Soc., N.S..V ΠΙ (1907-8), pp.33-78.
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would be closely akin to Moore's well-known later paradox concerning an
assertion made by means of an utterance of the sentence
"It is raining, but I don't believe it."
In Amsterdam, on the other hand, L.E. J. Brouwer, the founder of
mathematical intuitionism, naturally opted for the knowability of truth and
refrained from affirming the law of bivalence.9
The undefinability of truth was challenged early on, in two different
ways: first, realistically, by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus and, secondly,
idealistically, by Arend Heyting in his proof-theoretical semantics for the
intuitionistic logical particles.10 Both these challenges constitute
variations on the truth-maker version of the correspondence theory of
truth. This version is characterized by the reduction principle:
The proposition A is true
iff
there exists a truth-maker for A.11
It is important to stress here that this scheme is completely neutral with
respect to the logic that holds for the propositions in question. In
particular, the status of the principle of bivalence, which states that every
proposition is either true or false, is underdetermined by the scheme and
depends essentially on the notions of truth-maker and existence that are
employed in the formulation of the truth-maker analysis.
The constructivist truth-maker in Heyting's work is, of course, the
proof(-object) of the proposition in question. This alternative, moderate
idealist, theory has been considerably elaborated, technically as well as
philosophically, by the Swedish logician Per Martin-Lof and will not fur-
ther be dealt with in the present paper.12
9
 'Over de onbetrouwbaarheid der logische principes'. Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 2
(l 908), pp. 152-158.
0
 L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-philosophicus, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London,
1922, and A. Heyting, 'Die intuitionistische Grundlegung der Mathematik', Erkenntnis 2
(1931), pp. 106-115.
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Wittgenstein, in contradistinction to Bolzano and Frege and in
explicit opposition to the latter, construed his propositions linguistically
in a non-platonistic way: a proposition is a sign in use (with meaning).
Each (elementary) proposition A presents a certain Sachverhalt (state of
affairs) SA. In accordance with the scheme above this Sachverhalt serves
as truth-maker for the proposition:
The proposition A is true
iff
the state of affairs SA exists(obtains).
In the Tractatus it is of crucial importance that the existence of states of
affairs is a bivalent notion, so that the principle of bivalence for
propositions is induced via the truth-maker analysis of propositional
truth. In virtue of this truth-maker analysis, also the relation of logical
consequence between propositions is explained in terms of the (relative)
existence of state of affairs and logic is thus essentially converted into a
means for calculating what Sachverhalte obtain under the supposition that
certain other Sachverhalte obtain.
Wittgenstein is very hostile to epistemological matters in the
Tractatus. In the notorious 4.442 he sharply rejects the use of an
assertion sign by Russell and Frege (which use was retained in the
constructivist tradition by Heyting). Indeed, his non-platonistic concept of
proposition may seem like a vestige of epistemology in his work, but the
appearances are misleading: for logic, the central notions are not those of
the proposition and its truth, but the state of affairs and its existence, and
the latter are certainly just as platonistic as the Bolzanian Sätze an sich
and Fregean Gedanken.
The development of the non-euclidean geometries and the ensuing
notion of axioms as hypotheses played an important role in the banish-
ment of content from logic. Hubert, who perfected this view of
axiomatization in his work on the Foundations of Geometry,
subsequently applied the same type of axiomatization in his metamathe-
matics. Here, however, matters are sharpened considerably in that the
mathematical propositions are formalistically construed as
metamathematical well-formed formulae, whence they are totally void of
content. A metamathematical "expression" is a (meta)mathematical
object; it does not express anything, but may itself, just like any other
mathematical object be expressed by means of a mathematical
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expression. Nobody would have thought of using contentless formalisms
in logic except for Hubert's programme. By taking the idea seriously that
mathematical propositions can be objects of mathematical study, e.g. that
they are mathematical objects, and, in fact, even by converting them into
the prime examples of mathematical objects, namely (Gödel) numbers,
Gödel was able to refute the Hubert programme. At the same time Tarski
effectuated the separation between syntax and semantics (that was
already foreshadowed in earlier work where the formation rules for the
well-formed formulae have to be given prior to the deduction rules; the
rules of meaningfulness must not depend on the rules of truth is the
slogan behind all this.).13 It should be noted that the truth predicate, as
defined by Tarski, is not applicable to mathematical propositions, but to
certain (meta)mathematical objects. Applied to natural language, it is as
if we were to apply truth primarily, not to propositions, or to meaningful
sentences, but to the ink-stains or chalk with which such sentences are
written. Another important feature is that Tarski's definition is
completely neutral with respect to the properties of truth: they are
completely dependent on the logic that is applicable in the meta theory.
This view of formalisms, with formal languages without content, and with
the ensuing separation of "syntax" and "semantics" is, by now,
completely accepted as the official philosophy of logic, and is rarely, if
ever, commented upon.
On the semantical level, the earlier tradition from Boole,14 and
Schroder,15 concerning Umfangslogik, which was sharply criticized by
Frege and Husserl,16 was taken up again , and given prominence, with
the contemplation of different universes of discourse, as employed in the
semantics of pure predicate logic. This idea can easily be coupled with the
earlier idea concerning the use of contentless formalisms and this, in fact,
gets done in the model-theoretic transformation of Tarski's original ideas
concerning the definition of truth, first given, as far as I know, by Tarski
13
 'Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen', Studio Philosophien l (1936),
pp.261-405.
14
 The Mathematical Analysis of Logic, reprint, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1948.
5
 Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik,Vols. 1-3, reprint Chelsea, Ν. Υ. 1966.
16
 Cf.G. Frege, 'Kritische Beleuchtung einiger Punkte in E. Schröders Vorlesungen über die
Algebra der Logik', Archiv für systematische Philosophie, l (1895), pp. 433-456.
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and Vaught in 1957.17 Here, the truth-maker analysis is relativized to the
set-theoretical structure chosen. One is now not interested in the outright
truth of a proposition, but in the satisfiability of a wff φ with respect to
the structure 5Ϊ, relative to the variable assignment s. Thus, in the
Tarski-Vaught definition, what gets meaning is not the formula φ, which
will remain a mathematical object void of semantical content. What is
given meaning is the three-place (meta)mathematical relation
φ is satisfied by s in 51.
In virtue of the systematic recursion by which the satisfaction condition is
laid down each formula φ, together with the sequence s, serves to
determine a certain set-theoretical state of affairs SA
 s
 with respect to
the structure 51, such that
φ is satisfied by s with respect to 51
iff
S<b,s obtains in the structure 51.
(The precise shape of the state of affairs depends of the wff chosen and is
determined by the recursion clauses.) The principle of bivalence is uni-
formly accepted for the existence of such states of affairs: a state of
affairs either exists or it does not exist. With this reformulation of
Tarski's model-theoretic version, its connection to the Tractatus
formulation becomes obvious Naturally enough, also the notion of logical
consequence between well-formed formulae, which is explained in terms
of satisfaction, can be explained in terms of the (relative) obtaining of the
corresponding set-theoretical states of affairs regarding the structure 51.
The use of predicate logic mixed with natural language is more than
common. One often encounters examples such as
(Vx)(x is a man —> χ is mortal),
where, properly speaking, natural language is treated as if it were a
formal language and consequently the model-theoretic semantics is
applicable. This means that the world is treated as a set-theoretic
" 'Arithmetical Extensions of Relational Systems', Compositio Mathematica 13 (1957),
pp.81-102.
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structure, THE REAL WORLD, say, which can serve as a model for the
language in question. This procedure then entails that all ontological
assumptions on the structures that are current in the Tarskian paradigm
get exported onto the world. In particular, the sharpness of all concepts,
which have to have clear-cut boundaries, and the unlimited validity of
classical logic, are simply built into the semantics used.
I have put matters in this overly explicit way, so as to spell out with
maximum clarity what is definitionally involved in an application of
Tarskian, model-theoretic, semantics to natural language. Normally,
when teaching a course on beginning or intermediate logic, one would not
dwell on the fact that the formalisms studied really have no content, or
the the validity of a crucial logical principle is something which is simply
postulated rather than argued for. This policy of didactic silence means
that philosophy students who have been given a dose of first order logic
in their first year course, but who have had no further contact with the
subject, run the risk of being misled, simply in virtue of the logic they
have been taught to use.
One area, where the use of logic thus conceived might be particular
pernicious, is that of the philosophy of mind. Here, the mere use of the
current logical paradigm with its concomitant referential semantics seems
to foist the idea of a world "out there" onto us. In other words, Cartesian
dualism is built into the position from the outset, simply owing to the use
of a referential semantics for the language, according to which THE
REAL WORLD is fixed and ready, sharply delineated in all its aspects
and where the answer to every possibly question is already decided. In
fact, this view of the world, that is inherited from the semantics, is
nothing but, what Williams has dubbed, 'the absolute conception of the
world'.18 For basically (jpaf)Wittgensteinian reasons, I would decline a
dualistic conception of mind and world, and, most certainly, I do not wish
to have it forced upon me in the course of carrying out my professional
duties as the holder of a Chair of Logic.
Similarly, the common use of arguments in philosophy will, when
these arguments are held to be ultimately formalizable in predicate logic,
enforce the view that all philosophical questions have an answer and that
nominal terms in philosophical discourse function as objects of reference.
The subject matter of the reasoning will be construed according to
referential, Tarskian, semantics and will ultimately issue a picture of
18
 In Descartes. The Project of Pure Inquiry, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1978.
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philosophy as an enormous set-theoretic structure, call it TRUE
PHILOSOPHY (which, or so it seems, has to be a substructure of the
structure THE REAL WORLD, be it elementary or not), that comprises
all possible philosophical theories, set out in just the right way: the
positions of philosophy are transformed into set-theoretical states of
affairs concerning the structure TRUE PHILOSOPHY and the
correctness of a position becomes the existence of the corresponding
state of affairs. Propositions are turned into objects of reference in the
structure TRUE PHILOSOPHY and there will be an enormous
proliferation of entities. Take the proposition E°° that there are infinitely
many primes. It is an element in the domain of TRUE PHILOSOPHY, but
also the proposition that the proposition E°° is true is such an element as
is the proposition that the proposition that E°° is true is true , and so on.
Indeed, the referential links between the structures THE REAL WORLD
and TRUE PHILOSOPHY and the respective languages must
themselves occur as states of affairs inside the structure REAL WORLD
and the languages in questions, as well as the two structures themselves
must also be elements of the domain of REAL WORLD. Again, for
Wittgensteinian, and this time basically Tractarian, reasons concerning
internal relations, these consequences do not appeal to me.
The point of the above two examples is that the logic that is
applicable with respect to a passage of natural language should be read
off from, but not be read into, the passage in question. The use of a fixed
and ready semantical perspective forces the presuppositions of that
perspective onto the the matter under discussion. In my opinion the
philosophical benefits that result from such a procedure, if such there be,
do not in any way outweigh the philosophical problems that emerge. The
most clear-cut of these can perhaps be brought out via the following
reasoning: the reference relation and other basic features of the structure
THE REAL WORLD can be talked about in natural language, but then
they have to be states of affairs in that structure, rather than the relations
in virtue of which certain states of affairs can be presented by proposi-
tions. Those relations can thus be talked about in propositions, which
then have to present (other) states of affairs in the structure THE REAL
WORLD, which would have to depend on (other) reference relations, and
so on ad infinitum. I, for one, have no faith in the upper stages of this
regress and, accordingly, I prefer to step off this referential bandwagon
before it takes off. As Tarski himself clearly realized, natural language is
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"semantically closed" and knows no metalanguage. The present point
was put with particular clarity by Arthur C. Danto:
Let 5 be a sentence which is about the world. Any such sentence I shall call
descriptive. If s is descriptive, and about the world, what shall we say about
the sentence 's is true'? The latter, unlike s, is about s. But it is not wholly
about s, the way for example, the sentence's is a sentence' is about s. Rather it
is about s and the world together. And it tells us something which 5 does
not.lt does not tell us anything about the world beyond what s alone tells us.
It only tells us that what s says about the world is so. Sentences which are
about the relations between the world and sentences, I shall speak of as se-
mantical. Relations within the world find verbal expression in descriptive
sentences. Relations between the world and descriptions of the world find
verbal expression in semantical sentences. The distinction is absolute and
irreducible, quite as the relation between language and the world is not
reducible to just another intra-worldly-relation. The world is an external
world only in the respect that semantical relations are not intra-worldly.
Bad philosophy is always generated by trying to flatten semantical rela-
tionships into further bits of the world, and allowing the distinctions we
have been drawing to collapse.19
The considerations offered above concerning the consequences of
the model-theoretic perspective in semantics are, of course, strongly
dependent on my personal philosophical taste. Since I myself do not
share the realist paradigm with respect to the objectivity and solvability
of philosophical problems, it does not shock me to find a reference to
personal taste in a philosophical argument. Indeed, I do not expect there
to be any knockdown arguments in philosophy. Fichte, in a perceptive
discussion of the realist/anti-realist debate, remarked that one could not
expect either party ever to convince the other; what you get is a helix of
ever more refined positions, each of which tries to take the alleged de-
fects of its predecessor positions into account.20 I am gratified to find
myself in agreement on this point with one of the foremost (founder-)
exponents of the realist logico-semantical tradition, namely the late
Heinrich Scholz, who was fully aware of the strong ontological pre-
suppositions underlying the realist framework he preferred.21 He
explicitly endorsed the argument offered in the defence of realism by
Bertrand Russell:
19
 Analytical Theory of Knowledge, C.U.P., 1968, p. x.
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 'Erste Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre', Philosophisches Journal, V (1797), 1-47.
21
 Heinrich Scholz (f) and Gisbert Hasenjaeger, Grundzüge der Mathematischen Logik,
Springer, Berlin, 1961, Einleitung, pp. 11-12.
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My argument for the law of excluded middle and against the definition of
'truth' in terms of 'verifiability' is not that it is impossible to construct a
system on this basis, but rather that it is possible to construct a system on
the opposite basis, and that this wider system, which embraces unverifiable
truths, is necessary for the interpretation of beliefs which none of us, if we
are sincere, are prepared to abandon.22
Scholz concludes his excellent treatment with a moral that is
paraphrase of remark of Fichte's concerning the nature of philosophy:
"Was für eine Logik man wähle, hängt davon ab,
was für ein Mensch man is",
and I know of no better moral with which to end the present discussion.
Faculty of Philosophy
22
 The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell (third edition), P.A. Schilpp (ed.), Tudor Publ. Co.,
N.Y., 1951, p. 682.
